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DISCOVERY AGAINST MANUFACTURERS
IN AIR CRASH LITIGATION
DONALD W. MADOLE*
D ISCOVERY against a manufacturer requires careful analysis
of accident causation and the use of all available discovery
tools. Under federal law, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over investigation of
aircraft accidents.' A thorough knowledge of the Board's accident
investigation procedures is essential.
Data collected from federal accident investigations may be ob-
tained pursuant to regulations found in 14 C.F.R. § 435 (Disclos-
ure of Aircraft Accident Investigation Information). A "major"
catastrophic accident will usually be the subject of a public hearing
conducted in accordance with 14 C.F.R. § 431. Following the
hearing, copies of the transcript and exhibits may be obtained from
the NTSB (the cost usually runs about $1000-$2000). The public
hearing does not occur until weeks and sometimes months after the
accident. Counsel should conduct sufficient prehearing investiga-
tion to get the most out of the testimony and exhibits which can
be reviewed in the public docket. Generally, if a manufacturing or
design defect is suspected, the exhibit documents, which are those
produced by the Structures Group, the Power Plants Group and
the Systems Group, should receive early and careful attention. The
group chairman's factual reports and underlying exhibits give a
* Donald W. Madole is an attorney practicing in Washington, D.C. and New
York, New York. The author has been a trial attorney with the Federal Aviation
Administration; Chief, Hearings and Report Division and Attorney Advisor,
Bureau of Safety, Civil Aeronautics Board; and United States Delegate to Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization Conference on Aircraft Investigation. He
has served as lead counsel in major air crash litigation resulting from airline
crashes. He wishes to acknowledge the valuable research of law clerk, George
Glasco, in the preparation of this paper.
149 U.S.C. § 1654 (1971), with incorporation by reference of Title VII of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. (1971).
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clue to involvement of the manufacturer if they contain detailed
records of the aircraft and its component parts, particularly any
"pre-impact failure." There will be documentation of the various
tests conducted on the components and photographs of the physical
condition and location of the wreckage following the accident.
The location and distribution of the wreckage can be important
evidence of whether an aircraft came apart in flight, the manner in
which it came apart, and the direction of flight. If the wreckage
is concentrated into one small area, it can sometimes be deter-
mined that a complete aircraft struck the ground. Plaintiff's coun-
sel will seldom have an opportunity to view the wreckage at the
site because they are not retained until weeks after the occurrence.
Even if retained, the aircraft wreckage is under the exclusive cus-
tody of the National Transportation Safety Board investigators
who generally preclude counsel from participating in or observing
the investigation firsthand. The authority of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board is spelled out in the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) Act of 1966.2
Reports of tests and analyses are also found in NTSB docu-
ments which may describe:
(a) Physical and chemical analysis of portions of the wreck-
age;
(b) Metallurgical analysis in the form of spectograph, x-ray
or metalograph data;
(c) Photographs or descriptions of metal fractures either due
to tension, compression, fatigue, torsion or shearing.
Every aircraft manufacturer will collect and retain information
about the following:
1. Initial design;
2. Specifications of material;
3. Certification data relating to government approval;
4. Service Letters sent out by the manufacturer to the cus-
tomers;
5. Service Bulletins sent out to owners and maintenance
organizations;
6. Airworthiness Directives of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration;
249 U.S.C. § 1654 (1971).
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7. Engineering reports;
8. Flight test reports;
9. Malfunction and defect reports which are furnished to the
manufacturer; and
10. Customer complaints.
This brief checklist is just the beginning. The best checklist is
found among the data in the Federal Regulations which are dis-
cussed immediately below.
FEDERAL AIR REGULATIONS SET THE STANDARDS REQUIRED
BY AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS IN THE PRODUCTION
OF U.S. CIVIL AIRCRAFT
The Supreme Court has held that under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause' the Constitution gives Congress the power to regu-
late all navigable airspace and they can delegate that power to an
appropriate agency." In response to that power, the Congress has
passed various items of legislation culminating in the Department
of Transportation Act of 1966.' The DOT Act incorporates most
of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,' which
gives the Federal Aviation Administrator the power to promulgate
certain rules, regulations or minimum standards to further air
commerce and safety.'
Before a manufacturer can place an aircraft on the market, he
is required to have his aircraft certified by the FAA and receive a
"type" certificate. There is an entire section of the DOT Act de-
voted to the certification of aircraft and the requirements for the
issuance of a "type" certificate.
First, the Act requires the Secretary of Transportation, through
the Administrator of the FAA, to specify in regulations the appli-
ances for which the issuance of a "type" certificate is reasonably
required in the interest of safety. The Act further directs the Ad-
ministrator to require the applicant for a "type" certificate to make
such tests during the manufacture and upon completion as are
deemed necessary in the interest of public safety. This includes
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
149 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq. (1971).
649 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1971).
749 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1971).
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flight tests, tests of raw materials or any part of the aircraft, engine,
propeller or appliance! Then, if the Administrator finds that the
aircraft is of the proper design, material specification, construction,
and performance for safe operation, and meets the minimum stand-
ards, rules and regulations prescribed, the Act directs him to is-
sue a "type" certificate Then, the manufacturer is required to com-
ply with the Federal Air Regulations (FAR's) in the design of
United States civil aircraft.
An additional requirement imposed by the Act is the necessity
for obtaining a "production" certificate."0 The "production" certi-
ficate must be in conformity with the "type" certificate."
Next, before the aircraft may be flown, the Act requires that it
have an "airworthiness" certificate which attests to its fitness for
flight after inspection by the FAA."
Armed with this statutory authority, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministrator has issued the Federal Air Regulations (FAR's) in
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These FAR's pro-
vide a universal standard of minimum conduct within the aircraft
manufacturing community. An outline of the duties a manufacturer
must fulfill prior to sale of the aircraft are found in 14 C.F.R. Parts
21, 23 and 25. The FAR's contain one set of requirements for
"normal," i.e., general aviation aircraft and another, more strin-
gent, regulatory specification for "transport," i.e., airline aircraft.
For "normal" category aircraft, regulations cover everything from
longitudinal stability characteristics to fire extinguishers." There are
well over 1000 sections in Part 23, so you can get some idea of the
detail in this part of the regulations. Should your litigation involve
transport aircraft, you will be concerned with additional testing
and operating limitations, flight characteristics and system require-
ments.' Counsel can use the Federal Air Regulations as a guide
to documentary evidence that is kept by the manufacturer in the
normal course of his business. If the manufacturer denies the
existence of such material, you can introduce the Federal Aviation
849 U.S.C. 5 1423(a)(1) (1971).
949 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(2) (1971).
1049 U.S.C. S 1423(b) (1971).
1149 U.S.C. 5 1423(b) (1971).
1249 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1971).
1"14 C.F.R. § 23 (1974).
1414 C.F.R. § 25 (1974).
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Regulations to show failure of the defendant manufacturer to com-
ply with discovery. In Lilly v. Grand Trunk & Western Railroad,"
the Supreme Court held that the rules, regulations and orders of
administrative agencies of the United States Government, promul-
gated pursuant to statutory authority, are appropriate subjects of
judicial notice.
If you are dealing with a foreign manufactured aircraft, look for
the "bilateral airworthiness agreement" which will be a treaty be-
tween the United States and the nation where the aircraft was
certificated and manufactured. The United States Government us-
ually requires special conditions or limitation on foreign manufact-
ured aircraft which are operated in the United States. If the aircraft
is manufactured outside of the United States and operated under
other than United States registry, then you can look to the stand-
ards and recommended practices in the annex to International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).'
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-FEDERAL RULE 34
After analysis of the NTSB material and review of the FAR's
indicate what is relevant, the next item of business is to decide on
the most efficient method of obtaining the information. Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended effective
July 1, 1970 by deleting the requirement for a showing of "good
cause" for the production of documents. Today's criteria for dis-
covery is relevancy. Federal Rule 26(b) allows a party to discover
any matter "not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action," and inadmissibility at trial is not
a basis for objection so long as the information sought "appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence. 1. The Federal Rules permit parties the greatest latitude in
their discovery and in their preparation for trial. The rules are
liberally construed to effect these purposes. 8
DOCUMENT DEPOSITORIES
Mass disaster litigation resulting from the crash of a commercial
-317 U.S. 481 (1943).10Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947).
'
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
28Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
airliner usually is subject to jurisdiction of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation." Thousands of pages of documents will be
required for proper discovery against a manufacturer in such a
case. The Manual for Complex Litigation of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States (January 1, 1973) calls for the use of
document depositories. The following section of the Manual is
particularly useful when proceeding against a manufacturer, who
probably will have accumulated voluminous documents on a par-
ticular aircraft: "When voluminous documents may be inspected
and copied by many parties the development of centralized deposi-
tories is a major step forward in the orderly, efficient and economic-
al processing of the complex case.""
It is appropriate for plaintiff's counsel to seek an order relating
to all defendants, which specifies the manner in which documents
are to be produced, copied and retained. It is the defendant man-
ufacturer who has the best knowledge of the contents, location and
description of the various documents that contain the information
about the design and manufacture of the aircraft. Therefore, the
efficient administration of justice is consistent with an order which
requires that:
Any party who has produced or does produce any document or
thing shall as to all such documents or things give a complete and
detailed index setting forth a sufficiently detailed identification
and pagination of each document or thing and the precipient wit-
ness concerning said document together with a reference to the
request to produce by item number, and the identifying language
of the request to produce pursuant to which the document is pro-
duced."
A central depository is useful and economical and saves the ex-
pense of making copies of each and every document produced in
discovery. A depository which generally contains hundreds of
thousands of pages allows counsel to inspect the documents in an
orderly manner and then determine whether or not copies of par-
ticular pages are required for use in discovery and trial of the
case. A federal judge, wise to unnecessary delay due to "gamesman-
ship," has ordered that: "Production of such documents constitutes
1928 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. 1974).
21MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.50, at 38 (C.C.H. 1973).
2t In re Air Crash Disaster at Juneau, Alas., on Sept. 4, 1971, No. - (C.D.
Cal., order dated Feb. 11, 1973.).
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admission of authenticity of the documents so produced provided,
however, that this does not constitute a waiver of defendant's right
to object to the use of the documents with regard to materiality,
relevancy or hearsay.""2
Each document should be produced in the presence of a court
reporter, marked for identification at the time, and a transcript
retained of the production session.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION BY CATEGORIES
There was a time when the courts construed rule 34 to require
the moving party to list with specificity the documents he required
to examine. As society becomes more complex, new technological
data appears daily and even the exercise of due diligence does not
always allow the advocate to list documents with the required spe-
cificity. Therefore, later cases have enlarged the rule to permit
discovery where the documents were listed by category. Moore, in
his treatise on federal practice, states: "Designation by category is
sufficient, then, and the categories themselves need be defined only
with reasonable particularity. The question is whether a reasonable
man would know what documents or things are called for."'
In Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.,"4
a description of all documents, memoranda, correspondence and
other writings written on or before June 15, 1958 and relating di-
rectly or indirectly to a licensing agreement in dispute was proper.'
DISCOVERY OF POST ACCIDENT TESTS, REPORTS,AND EVEN
ACCIDENT REPORTS ARE ALLOWED
Often defendants object to discovery of post accident matter but
it has been generally concluded that it is proper to discover post
accident documents." The recent cases require the discovery of
22 In re Air Crash Disaster at Juneau, Alas., on Sept. 4, 1971, No. - (C.D.
Cal., order dated Feb. 23, 1972).
2 4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 34.07, at 34-57 (2d ed. 1974), cited in
Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D. 58, 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), discussed infra.
2424 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2 Id.
"
5See 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 26.56(I), at 26-137 (2d ed. 1974);
Caulk v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 306 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Md. 1969); Baker v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 17 FED. RULES SERV. 30b.352 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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items which are relevant to the subject matter regardless of admis-
sibility. Even a post accident report of an air crash is discoverable.
In fact, such reports have been found admissible in air crash liti-
gation. Post accident admissions and safety modification have been
used to prove breach of warranty of a manufacturer. Such evidence
is admissible as proof of breach of warranty because it discloses a
defect. Whether or not the manufacturer was or was not negligent
is of no consequence if the defect was a proximate, contributing
cause. 7 Certainly, if they are admissible in evidence, a fortiori dis-
covery should be available without argument. Thus, in Pekelis v.
Transcontinental & Western Air Inc.,28 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit expressly ruled that a post accident report on an
air crash was admissible in evidence. Decisions in other cases have
reached similar results."
EVEN THOUGH DOCUMENTS CONTAIN OPINIONS OF THE
DEFENDANT MANUFACTURERS' EXPERTS, THEY ARE
STILL DISCOVERABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
Much confusion has arisen due to the change in rule 26(b) (4)
of the Federal Rules which relates to the opinions of experts which
are not to be called at trial. The views of the Advisory Committee
are helpful in determining what they meant in the drafting of the
revised words in rule 26(b) (4) where they said:
It should be noted that the subdivision does not address itself
to the expert whose information was not acquired in preparation
for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with respect
to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter
of the lawsuit. Such an expert should be treated as an ordinary
witness."0
Thus, in resolving the issue of the opinions of expert employees of
the defendant manufacturer, the court is governed by the provisions
"7Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
28 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
" See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass.
1943); Scarborough v. Aeroservice, Inc., 155 Neb. 749, 53 N.W.2d 902 (1952);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1955).
10 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 503.
1974] DISCOVERY AGAINST MANUFACTURERS 489
of rule 26(b) (1). As one would expect, this issue has received
past judicial attention by federal and state courts." The court said
in United Air Lines v. United States: "Discovery is not automatic-
ally precluded because the sought after material contains expert
opinions or conclusions.)' '
Most specifically, in Kendall v. United Air Lines it was stated:
"An interrogatory is not objectionable because it calls for an expert
opinion, especially where the expert is an engineer in the regular
employ of the defendant.""'
In United States v. Meyere the court allowed appraisers who had
been specifically employed by the United States for purposes of
the instant condemnation action, to testify about their opinions. In
Wilmington Country Club v. Horwath & Horwath,' the court
ordered defendants to answer interrogatories calling for opinions
derived from its investigation of the circumstances. The court
stated: "The fact that plaintiff seeks what may be characterized as
an opinion, moreover is not fatal to this interrogatory.'
'
Meese v. Eaton Manufacturing Co. 7 is most explicit on this
point. Noting the old and discarded rule restricting discovery to
"facts," the court observed that the better view "permits interro-
gatories addressed to matters of opinion."" Hence, plaintiffs were
ordered to answer interrogatories regarding opinions about their
patents. In his treatise on federal practice, Professor Moore sup-
ports this position:
The question should be, not whether as a theoretical matter the
inquiry calls for an expression of opinion, but rather whether it is
practicable and feasible to answer the inquiry and if so, whether an
answer might expedite the litigation by either narrowing the area
31 United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 73 (9th Cir. 1968); Wilmington Coun-
try Club v. Horwath & Horwath, 46 F.R.D. 65, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Meese v.
Eaton Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Broadway & 96th St. Realty
Co. v. Loews Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Russo v. Merck &
Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957); Kendall v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 F.R.D.
702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D.
594 (W.D. Pa. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948).
2 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960).
33 9 F.R.D. at 703.
"'398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
"46 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
6 Id. at 66.
37 35 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
31 Id. at 165-66.
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of controversy or avoiding unnecessary testimony or providing a
lead to evidence.39
Since such post accident reports are admissible, they certainly are
discoverable. Courts distinguish between persons who are regular
employees and those specifically retained in regard to the litigation.
In the former, there is less concern that the party will be unfairly
treated if opinion testimony is allowed. There is no economic un-
fairness where the witness is merely testifying about opinions and
conclusions previously reached during the course of the witness'
employment. One learned scholar has commented that: "Most
courts hold that as to knowledge already acquired whether it be by
observation or by expert conclusion the expert should be treated as
any other person having information vital to the determination of
a legal controversy."" °
He concluded that: "The most satisfactory way to solve the prob-
lems of discovery in this area is by a free exchange of all relevant
expert data.""
Obviously, there is no logical or reasonable basis to distinguish
between opinions and conclusions committed to paper by a party's
employees and those in less concrete form in the minds of the em-
ployees. Further, a factitious corporate entity can only speak
through the mouths of its directors, officers and employees. The
law must rely on what the individuals say and do. The Honorable
Fred M. Winner, United States District Judge for the District of
Colorado, pointed out that:
The test for discovery purposes, of course, is a far different test
than that applied should the report or opinions therein voiced be
offered at the time of trial. Opinions expressed in the report might
or might not be received in evidence. But that is a matter to be de-
termined at time of trial. But, the reports may well lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence and that's what a modern-day law-
suit is all about.'
1' 4 J. MOORE, supra note 23, at 5 26.56(3). See also Hawkins v. Gorea Motor
Express, Inc., 360 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1966); Taylor v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 344
F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1965); Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adversary Party's
Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962).
4 0 Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 479.
41 Id. at 488.
4 Deweese v. United States, No. - (D. Colo., order dated July 10, 1972).
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DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS,
MANAGING AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS-FEDERAL RULE 30
A deposition is the sworn statement of a witness recognized
under appropriate circumstances as equivalent to testimony at the
trial.' The federal rules relating to depositions are designed to effect
discovery to the end of a just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action." The discovery rules were designed to grant
the widest latitude in ascertaining, before trial, facts concerning the
real issues in dispute, to eliminate the difficulty and expense of
producing facts and documents at the trial and to simplify the is-
sues.' It is well recognized that many states retain substantive
and procedural distinctions between "evidence" and "discovery"
depositions; but, the law is clear that restrictions in state rules of
procedure upon the scope of discovery are not binding in actions
brought in federal court."M
In the sequence of discovery against an aircraft manufacturer,
it has been our experience that the production, inspection and
copying of documents should be completed first, to be followed
thereafter by the deposition phase of the discovery. The 1970
amendments to rule 26, allow concurrent discovery, which means
that counsel may serve request for admissions during the deposi-
tions. This tactic tends to shorten the total time required during the
deposition phase because the requests for admissions, if properly
drafted, are effective tools in limiting the issues of fact. Even be-
fore the amendment of rule 26 a court held that a party could
simultaneously examine his adversary before trial and, also, require
him to respond to a request for admissions concerning the same
matter.47
WHOM Do You NOTICE FOR DEPOSITIONS?
It is generally true that United States civil aircraft are manufac-
tured by large corporations. As such, some planning is required
in the selection of the specific individuals to be deposed. A corpor-
43 Kierce v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 79 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1935).
44 United States ex rel. Weston & Brooker Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 303
F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1962).
4' Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908 (D. Mass. 1938).
"Keller v. Orion Ins. Co., 285 F. Supp. 906 (D. Minn. 1968).
4
1 Nekrasoff v. United States Rubber Co., 27 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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ation, whether a party or not, is not bound by a notice of taking
of depositions to produce its employees at such taking, with the
exception of officers, directors or managing agents of the party or
other persons "who consent to testify in its behalf." 8 Cases have
held that courts do not have the authority to direct a party to pro-
duce mere "employees" for examination. " Therefore, it is most
advisable to request production of organization charts, personnel
manuals, and job descriptions. There are also various industry ref-
erence sources that list the corporate management and organiza-
tional structure of aircraft manufacturers. Not everyone agrees
with this writer's view of the matter, but I prefer to initiate depo-
sitions with the highest corporate officer in the corporate unit that
designed, tested, manufactured and sold the aircraft involved in
the accident.
There has been a very broad determination as to manufacturers
and what constitutes a "managing agent.""0 In that instance, two
project engineers whose position was so insignificant as to fail to
be mentioned in the engineering organization charts were deemed
to be "managing agents" for the purpose of rule 30 and the notic-
ing of their deposition.
It is important to develop a theory of liability before noticing
depositions. There are literally dozens of organizations in any ma-
jor aircraft manufacturing corporation, and as a general rule, the
courts limit the number of persons that any party is allowed to
depose. There are cases that hold that the notice must designate
the specific directors, officers or managing agents of the corpora-
tion to be examined. 1 In fact, the corporate officer or agent must
be named in his official representative capacity to be properly notic-
ed. Merely naming him as an individual is insufficient." There are
holdings that a notice to take the deposition of a corporate party
through one of its officers does not give the examining party the
right to take such deposition through a different officer without
" FED. R. COv. P. 30(b)(6).
49 Mulligan v. Eastern S. S. Lines, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
5 0Tomingas v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 45 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 Kuerschner & Rauchwarenfabrik, A.G. v. New York Trust Co., 126 F.
Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
2 Gillam v. A. Shyman, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 475 (D. Alas. 1958). See also Com-
mander-Larabee Milling Co. v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 7 F.R.D. 168
(W.D.N.Y. 1945).
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previously serving notice to that effect. 3 However, it has been held
that a notice to take the deposition of a corporation through the
designation by title of employment, even though the individual's
name is not known, is sufficient. " Consistent with this view, it has
been ruled that a notice to take the depositions of a corporate party
by its vice presidents, treasurers, secretaries and managing agents,
and by persons performing under any other title the functions cor-
responding thereto is a proper description and that the corporation
party will be required to submit the names of such persons."
Modern management organizations have turned to the project
or task concept in personnel structure. Usually a corporate officer
or managing agent is designated as a "project manager" for a spe-
cific aircraft. The project manager should be named as a deponent
early in the sequence because he can reveal the structure of the
manufacturing organization that was responsible for the manufac-
ture of that particular model and type of aircraft. This is essential
because project organizations often are temporary corporate crea-
tures with a life limited to the design, certification and early man-
ufacture of the aircraft. The personnel involved may be drawn from
various segments of the corporate structure running the gamut from
engineering to purchasing and finance.
Aircraft manufacturers usually have a separate department for
engineering flight tests. Company test pilots are designated by the
FAA to perform the various tests to prove that the aircraft meets
the performance requirements of the Federal Air Regulations.
Where there is a flight performance question involved in the liti-
gation, and generally there is in every air crash case, it is always
advisable to designate in the notice the specific engineering test
pilot who flew the test flights on the model aircraft involved in the
accident. Sometimes it is rather difficult to obtain the name of that
individual. A deposition of the chief pilot is appropriate to elicit
an overview of the standard required in that department for the
test of all aircraft, including the hazards discovered in previous
flight test work. Of course, the chief pilot will know the identity of
53 Harry von Tilzer Music Publishing Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
54 Freeman v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 27 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
55 V. 0. Machinoimport v. Clark Equip. Co., 15 FED. RULES SERV. 30b.341,
Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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the engineering test pilot who performed the flight tests on the
model aircraft which is your matter of interest.
Depending on the causal factors involved in the occurrence,
you may need one or more engineers to discuss aerodynamics,
avionics systems or flight controls. Almost every aircraft is made
up of components that are manufactured by other companies and
sold to the aircraft manufacturer for inclusion in the model air-
craft. As such, you should inspect the equipment data as you may
need to depose personnel from the purchasing department to es-
tablish whether or not the decisions founded on economy resulted
in an aircraft that failed to meet the state of the aircraft manufac-
turers' art in the field of safety.
If it is a major catastrophic accident, you will know from the
NTSB records the identity of the manufacturer's personnel who
participated in the investigation groups. It is generally wise to de-
pose those individuals because they were selected because of ex-
tensive knowledge of the aircraft, which provides the dual advant-
age of pre-accident evidence along with eyewitness descriptions of
the observations at the scene of the accident.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE PLACE OF DISCOVERY
In aircraft litigation, the location of discovery often becomes
a matter of some contention amongst the parties. The very nature
of civil aviation very often results in litigation that is hundreds or
even thousands of miles away from the place where the aircraft
was manufactured. Therefore, the place of discovery, both as to
discovery of documents and the taking of depositions, is a matter
which requires a great deal of consideration. There is no question
that the court has the power to alter the place of discovery." Rule
26 provides that upon motion by party, or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court
may order that the discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including the designation of the place. It is expen-
sive for the manufacturer to provide transportation and per diem
to its officers and employees for depositions to be taken thousands
of miles away. Although there are numerous cases on this point,
suffice it to say in some situations courts have ordered the deposi-
6 Stephens v. Minder Constr. Corp., 3 F.R.D. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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tions to be taken at the situs of the litigation, where in other cases
the location of the manufacturing company has been chosen by
the court." As a practical matter, it is often less expensive and
more efficient ultimately for counsel to travel to the manufacturer's
plant for the taking of depositions. There, a deponent cannot ex-
cuse his "loss of memory" by the simple statement that "the rec-
ords relating to that matter are back in my office," as the parties
can take a short recess to await those records and complete the
matter expeditiously.
The advantage of the situs of the manufacturing plant is often
counter-balanced by the fact that a recalcitrant witness or, as is
more normally the case, an over-zealous counsel for the aircraft
manufacturer's insurance company sometimes does not hesitate
to instruct a witness not to answer, or refuses production when he
knows that he is five thousand miles away from the courthouse.
When such a tactic is taken, very careful records must be main-
tained and the party taking the deposition should exercise care to
see that all of the provisions relating to sanctions in rule 37 are
complied with in order to provide for assessment of costs against
the party that has refused to comply with discovery.
There is some confusion that arises by the limitations as to dis-
tance set out on the subpoena powers of rule 45(d) (2), but the
general consensus is that such limitations do not apply to parties.
Although the Rule does not make a distinction between parties and
non-parties, the subpoena is not necessary to enforce attendance of
a party, and the court having jurisdiction of the person of the par-
ties would seem to have power to make reasonable orders for their
attendance in the district in which the action is pending or else-
where.
Some of these problems are compounded as to location when
the matter involves a foreign manufactured aircraft. Generally,
the provisions relating to the taking of depositions through letters
rogatory (rule 31) found in the rules are both cumbersome and
time-consuming and it is by far more desirable to get stipulation
5 Fairwater Transport Co. v. Chris-Craft Corp., 1 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) (situs of manufacturer); Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 4 F.R.D.
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (situs of litigation); Jewish Consumptive Relief Soc'y v.
Rothfeld, 9 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (situs of litigation); Hyan v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1954) (no right in every case for de-
position at situs of forum).
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between the parties waiving the various objections as to the quali-
fication of the "officer" before whom the deposition is taken. Cer-
tainly, the failure of the party representing the foreign manufac-
turer, who fails to stipulate to the authority to take depositions be-
fore an otherwise nonqualified individual, might have second
thoughts should the court order the employees of the foreign cor-
porate defendant be required to travel to the place where the liti-
gation is pending in the United States. Rule 29 FRCP gives
specific authority to stipulate before whom depositions shall be
taken, and a stipulation that a deposition shall be taken before a
person otherwise disqualified under rule 28 (c) operates as a waiver
of such disqualification."
There is an interesting federal ruling on discovery of foreign
manufacturers. It has been held that a witness cannot refuse to ans-
wer a question on the ground of a privilege given him under foreign
law regardless of where the discovery occurs."
WHAT ABOUT A MASTER?
Rule 28(a), as amended, provides that a deposition may be
taken before a person appointed by the court in which the action
is pending. A person so appointed has power to administer oaths
and take testimony. A master may be appointed to supervise the
taking of a deposition, but the compensation should be paid by the
party requesting the appointment."' There is considerable discus-
sion, in the Manual for Complex Litigation beginning at section
320, of the relative merits and disadvantages of the appointment
of a special master in pre-trial discovery. In fact, the Manual quotes
the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that in one
case the referral to a master "amounted to little less than an abdi-
cation of the judicial function depriving the parties of a trial before
the court on the basic issues involved in the litigation." 1
A matter of great interest to all parties is that masters are very
costly and expect to be compensated on a "pay as you go" basis.
" Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
"Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales
S.A. v. McGrath, 9 F.R.D. 680 (D.D.C. 1950).
"Hirsch v. Glidden Co., 79 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
el MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 3.20, at 55 (C.C.H. 1973); Labuy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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There is authority in the federal courts to appoint full-time United
States Magistrates as masters to serve without compensation by
any party or parties. This writer has argued successfully in at least
one instance that the costs of the masters cannot be taxed as court
costs against the plaintiffs in multidistrict air crash litigation unless
the plaintiffs had requested the master and agreed to make such
payment, which they had not."
GENERAL PROCEDURAL RULES AS TO DISCOVERY
There are certain practical decisions that are well established
and the context of which is so broad as to perhaps be classified as
a legal theory, but I list them for reference. First, there is no pro-
hibition to conducting simultaneous discovery in a federal and a
state court action on identical issues.' Second, the scope of exam-
ination is only limited by relevancy and, as a practical matter, no
matter is irrelevant until it can clearly be shown that it has no pos-
sible bearing on the subject matter.' Third, when delay in discov-
ery is proposed because of a claim of a requirement for protection
of trade secrets or confidential information (which is made from
time-to-time in aircraft cases), the simple procedure is to follow
the process of limiting persons present at the discovery and to
protect the product of the discovery by sealing it. Both of these
security precautions are available through an order of the court in
accordance with rule 26(c). Fourth, with the 1970 amendment
there is no longer any fixed priority in the order of taking deposi-
tions, they simply make clear the power of the court to establish
priority. It has been our experience since the amendment of the
priority rule that the federal courts give priority to the first notice
filed. However, an intemperate race to the courthouse, which omits
essential witnesses from the notice of depositions or required docu-
ments from the request for production, could well be "good cause"
for a determination by the court that the sequence of discovery
should be altered.
"'In re Air Crash Disaster at Juneau, Alas., on Sept. 4, 1971, MDL-107.
" Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., 4 F.R.D. 167 (D. Del. 1944).
6' Application of Zenith Radio Corp., 1 F.R.D. 627, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1941).

